The "Basins at Risk" project's analytical tool helps identify areas where hydrological and political conditions suggest a higher likelihood of conflict over water. 5 Based on extensive analysis of the world's 263 international river basins, the project hypothesizes that "the likelihood of conflict rises as the rate of change within the basin exceeds the institutional capacity to absorb that change." Sudden physical changes or reduced institutional capacity are more conducive to disputes. Key examples include: 1) uncoordinated development of a major project that affects flow (such as a dam) in the absence of a treaty or commission; 2) "internationalized basins" such as in post-Soviet Central Asia; and 3) general animosity among parties. This approach gives us a set of indicators to monitor potential hot spots, and work ahead of the "crisis curve" to promote institutional capacity in advance of intractable conflict.
The following paragraphs outline the major linkages between conflict and water:
A. Access to adequate water supplies: Conflict is most likely to occur over water when disputes involve access to water of adequate quantity and quality. Even when water supplies are not severely limited, allocation of water among different users and uses (agriculture and urban residents, for example) can be highly contested. Degraded water quality, which can pose serious threats to health and aggravate scarcity, is also a source of potentially violent disputes. Finally, when water supplies for broadly irrigated regions decline either in terms of quantity or quality, those declines can spur migrations that could politically destabilize the receiving cities and/or neighboring countries B. Water, livelihood loss, and civil conflict: Water's importance in sustaining human livelihoods can indirectly link it to conflict. Water is a basic resource for agriculture, which is traditionally the largest source of livelihoods. If this livelihood is no longer available, people are often forced to search for job opportunities in the cities or turn to other, often illicit, ways to make a living. Migration-induced by lack of water, sudden droughts and floods, infrastructure construction (dams), pollution disasters, or livelihood loss-can produce tensions between local and incoming communities, especially when it increases pressure on already scarce resources. And poverty due to livelihood loss has been identified as a common denominator of the causes of conflict in most of the civil wars that emerged in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America during the last decade. 6 C. Water management and conflict: In most cases, however, it is not the lack of water that leads to conflict, but the inadequate way the resource is governed and managed. There are many reasons why water management fails, including lack of adequate water institutions, inadequate administrative capacity, lack of transparency, ambiguous jurisdictions, overlapping functions, fragmented institutional structures, and lack of necessary infrastructure.
Water management is highly complex and extremely political. Balancing competing interests over water allocation and managing water scarcity require strong institutions. A reliable database, including meteorological, hydrological, and socioeconomic data, is a fundamental tool for deliberate and farsighted management of water resources. Yet, reliable information is often difficult to obtain, especially in developing countries. Further, disparities among riparians' capacity to generate, interpret, and legitimize data can lead to mistrust and thus hinder cooperative action.
Water management in many countries is also characterized by overlapping and competing responsibilities among government bodies. Disaggregated decision-making often produces divergent management approaches that serve contradictory objectives and lead to competing claims from different sectors. And such claims are even more likely to contribute to disputes in countries where there is no formal system of water-use permits, or where enforcement and monitoring are inadequate. Controversy also often arises when management decisions are formulated without sufficient participation by local communities and water users, thus failing to take into account local rights and practices. Protests are especially likely when the public suspects that water allocations are diverting public resources for private gain or when water use rights are assigned in a secretive and possibly corrupt manner, as demonstrated by the violent confrontations in 2000 following the privatization of Cochabamba, Bolivia's water utility.
III.

Water as a Pathway to Peace
Transboundary cooperation around water, which stems from a drive for sustainable development in the face of shared stress, has a long and successful history. This development imperative-not the fear of conflict per se-motivates countries to pursue tough, protracted negotiations such as the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).
Aggressively pursuing a water peacemaking strategy can provide dividends beyond water for stakeholders. It can build trust and serve as an avenue for dialogue when parties are stalemated on other issues. Transboundary water institutions have proven resilient, even as conflict is waged over other issues (e.g., Picnic Table Talks , Mekong Committee, Indus River Commission). The strategy can also establish habits of cooperation among states, some with little experience (such as the states in the Kura-Araks basin in the Caucasus, or the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union).
Water can also be a key point in negotiating the end of a conflict, even if water did not precipitate it. For example, while water did not cause the wars between India and Pakistan, an updated agreement on the Indus River has played a central role in recent bilateral negotiations to end the conflict. In addition, peacemaking through water issues can forge people-to-people links, as demonstrated by the Good Water Makes Good Neighbors programs of the NGO Friends of the Earth Middle East or expert-to-expert (Track II) linkages along the Jordan or Indus rivers.
Finally, a water peacemaking strategy can create shared regional identities and institutionalize cooperation on a broader range of issues. Examples of this dynamic include the institutionalized environmental cooperation around the Baltic Sea during the Cold War (Helsinki Commission) and the current cooperation in post-apartheid Southern Africa through the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
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The United Nations and Water, Conflict, and Cooperation: Gaps and Options
A. Gaps: Water is a powerfully unifying resource, but because of its centrality to human life and our ecosystem, its management is generally diffused among the world's agencies and institutions. The UN is no exception-water-related expertise is spread throughout the system, including such bodies as UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNICEF, FAO, and the UN Economic Commissions, and partners such as the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility. 8 The fragmentation of this impressive expertise has historically prevented the UN from taking the lead in water-related conflict mitigation. To redress this problem, the UN system must integrate policy and coordinate its extensive but diffuse expertise on water, conflict, and cooperation across its bodies.
1.
International waters: The UN should develop an integrated, systematic program of preventive water diplomacy based on modified versions of the World Bank and Global Environment Facility frameworks. This program would 1) bolster early warning for regions with potential for water conflicts (conducted by, for example, UNEP's Division of Early Warning and Assessment); 2) develop a systematic program for enhancing institutional capacity between nations, including reconciling national legal frameworks (perhaps led by FAO's Development Law Service); and 3) craft, by unifying existing expertise, a "one-stop shop" for developing programs to enhance cooperation (such as UNESCO's recently launched Water Cooperation Facility). All these efforts should integrate traditional conflict-prevention bodies, such UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, in both the design and use of these products and capacities.
The UN must address a number of gaps that impede the implementation of this systematic, integrated program. First, only a small number of experienced water-dispute facilitators are viewed as truly neutral. The World Bank has a few, but they are in short supply at other UN bodies. The UN system should rebuild its ability by recruiting and training facilitators in hydrology, international law, regional history, and conflict prevention (the Universities Partnership for Transboundary Waters offers a model for developing and executing this training).
Second, UN conveners/facilitators and their bilateral funders must be willing to support long processes without requiring instant or easily measurable results. The World Bank's twenty-year commitment to the Nile Basin Initiative is an exemplary model, which the Bank is reproducing in other African basins. The UN should extend this model beyond Africa and encourage disparate UN bodies to cooperate as equal partners. Third, to achieve sustainable implementation, the UN must find ways to include all stakeholders throughout the process, in order to offset the secrecy that traditionally surrounds high-level negotiations. Unlike the NBI, this should not wait until state-tostate agreements have been reached.
Finally, the UN should seek to strengthen the capacity of parties to negotiate contested water issues. Disparities in capacity and knowledge have often led to mistrust between riparian countries, hindering cooperative action. Strengthening the negotiating skills of less powerful riparians can therefore help prevent conflict, as can strengthening their capacity to generate and authorize relevant data.
9 A hydrological database that is accepted by all stakeholders is essential for any joint management efforts, as it builds trust and enables water-sharing parties to make decisions based on the same understanding of the situation.
While pursuing this integrated program, the UN must avoid falling back on media-friendly but historically inaccurate scare tactics like warning of impending "water wars" between states. This is not the appropriate frame for these issues because 1) most organized violence from water conflict occurs not between states, but at the subnational and local levels or between sectors; 2) the "water wars" angle discourages the engagement of key developmental and environmental partners in favor of the security actors; 3) it does not easily lead to a program of action for conflict prevention and human development; and 4) we do not need to use violent conflict to prove that water is a matter of life and death. Indeed, by directly or indirectly contributing to 2-3 million deaths annually, unsafe drinking water poses a primary challenge to human security, as recognized by both the Millennium Development Goals and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.
2.
Intranational level: Many countries need stronger internal policies to regulate water use and to enable equal and sustainable management of their water resources. The UN should help strengthen the institutional and legal frameworks for managing water resources at the national level. To ensure that these national frameworks are implemented, the local level-at which water is actually used-requires more assistance (e.g., developing management institutions on the catchment level and institutionalizing community-based cooperative management mechanisms).
Regardless of the level of analysis, building capacity for integrated water management and conflict prevention is a critical role for the UN. Developing the human, technical, and administrative capacity to generate and analyze data, to develop sustainable management plans, and to implement these plans is necessary to enable water institutions to fulfill their management tasks and to prevent water-related disputes over the long term. Capacity building in conflict-management techniques (such as mediation and facilitation), as well as in stakeholder participation, helps mitigate conflicts and prevent disputes from emerging during decision-making.
B. Options: What form would a systematic, integrated program of preventive diplomacy and water take? Since most initiatives dealing with water, conflict, and cooperation are substantially underfunded and rarely reach beyond the project level, the challenge for the international community is to create an obvious earmark for international water conflict and cooperation funds, as the Global Fund is for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. Such a fund could utilize water to build confidence and prevent conflict, assess water facilitation skills to match capacity and opportunities, and reduce the number of overlapping and duplicative bilateral approaches.
As part of its program, the UN should create a forum to identify and articulate the needs of Southern stakeholders for transboundary water management, dispute resolution, and conflict transformation. Such forums as the World Commission on Water, Peace, and Security or the Water Cooperation Facility have already been proposed. The UN should also seek to integrate existing networks and platforms that address water and security linkages in the South.
In addition, water venues such as the 13 th Commission on Sustainable Development in 2005, UNWater, and the World Water Assessment Programme must move beyond technical management questions towards situating water and development issues in a larger peace and security context, integrating lessons from ongoing efforts like UNESCO's Potential Conflict to Cooperation Potential (PCCP) program and UNEP's Post-Conflict Assessment Unit.
10 By collaborating with these water forums, UN bodies focused on conflict could support the environmental priorities outlined in the Secretary-General's 2003 interim report on prevention of armed conflict.
V. Conclusion
By establishing a program of preventive diplomacy focused on water, the UN could coordinate its extensive but diffuse expertise. Such a program would assess basins at risk and bolster the earlywarning process for regions with conflict potential. The program would also enhance institutional capacity between nations (including reconciling national legal frameworks over water issues) and craft a "one-stop shop" with tools to develop programs to encourage transboundary cooperation. Through a Global Fund for Water-with special emphasis on understanding the Southern perspective and integrating conflict prevention units-the UN could improve water management and facilitation skills, reduce duplicate efforts, and use water to build confidence and prevent conflict. 
